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Mandatory retirement  is one means of  enforcing long-term contracts 
between employees and firms to insure that earnings over a worker’s 
tenure equal the value of that worker’s marginal product. In this paper, 
we argue that pension plans provide an alternative way to enforce these 
contracts. In section 12.1, we discuss the implications of  using pension 
plans as a mechanism for adjusting compensation to induce job exit. In 
section 12.2  we use actual earnings and pension data from the Retirement 
History Study to show the importance of pension benefits in labor com- 
pensation.  In section  12.3, we show the effect of  pension and social 
security rules on the pattern of  net wage earnings for workers nearing 
“traditional” retirement age and consider their use as an alternative to 
mandatory retirement. 
12.1  The Effect of Pension Plans on Net Wages 
The passage of  the 1977 Amendments to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act increased from 65 to 70 the minimum age at which a 
worker could be terminated for reasons of age alone. Some people have 
proposed  that  mandatory retirement  be eliminated  entirely. Edward 
Lazear has argued, however, that even in a competitive labor market, 
mandatory retirement may yield advantages to both labor and manage- 
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ment (Lazear 1979, p. 1264). He argues that while the 1977 Amendments 
will  aid the current group of  older workers, the total elimination of 
mandatory retirement would reduce economic efficiency. 
Lazear provides an important example of a life cycle approach to labor 
agreements. Once it is recognized that there is a multiperiod contract, it 
can be shown that the usual efficiency condition-that  the wage equals 
the value  of  the marginal product  (VMP)-is  no longer a necessary 
characteristic of a competitive market. Though it is true that a worker’s 
VMP over his tenure with a firm must equal his wage earnings over that 
period, wage earnings need not equal VMP during each period. “Other 
things equal, a worker would be indifferent between a wage path which 
paid him a constant dollar amount over his lifetime and another one 
which had the same present value but paid him less when he was young 
and more when he was old” (Lazear 1979, p. 1264). Other things equal, 
firms also would be indifferent between the two. As Lazear suggests, 
however, other things may not be equal, and it may pay both firms and 
workers to agree to long-term earning streams which pay workers less 
than their VMP when young and more than their VMP when old. This 
arrangement is superior because turnover and its attendant costs are 
decreased, and workers are induced to cheat less and work harder on the 
job (Lazear 1979, p. 1266). A necessary condition of such an agreement, 
however, is a mechanism for fixing a time after which the worker is no 
longer entitled  to receive wage  earnings  greater  than  VMP.  Lazear 
argues that mandatory retirement provides this mechanism. 
Clearly, mandatory retirement rules are one means of  forcing older 
workers to leave a job after some mutually agreed upon age. In this 
paper, however, we suggest that it is only one such mechanism. Firms can 
also use pension plans either to induce exit from the job or to reduce net 
earnings (as defined below) after some age. When a pension plan is part 
of  a total compensation package, long-term contracts can be enforced 
through pension rules which effectively penalize workers who stay on the 
job “too long.” 
Employer pension plans are an extremely important component of the 
financial environment for many older Americans. These plans are com- 
plex and differ in many aspects, such as coverage criteria, age of earliest 
eligibility, age of  full eligibility, benefit amount, and inflation protection 
after retirement. In empirical work on the impact of  these plans on 
worker behavior, it is necessary to ignore many of  the specifics of  the 
plans (which are often unknown to the researcher in any case) and to 
summarize the plans along very simple dimensions. 
The wealth equivalent of  pension rights provides an excellent summary 
statistic of the magnitude of a plan. At any moment in time, the value of a 
pension  to a worker  is equal to the present  discounted value  of  all 
anticipated future payments: 397  Pensions and Life Cycle Compensation 
PiBi(s)  WEALTH(s)=  C - 
i=s (1 + rli’ 
where s refers  to the time period  in  which pension benefits are first 
claimed. WEALTH(s) is actually a vector of  asset values for a pension 
initially taken at different periods (s),  all evaluated in present discounted 
value terms adjusted to period 0. &is  the probability of living through the 
ith period,  and Bi(s) is the benefit stream associated with a pension 
accepted in period s. The discount rate is r,  and n denotes the age at the 
end of  benefit receipt (arbitrarily chosen to be 100 in this research). 
Pension wealth is higher, the earlier one is eligible to accept benefits, 
the higher the benefits upon receipt, and the lower the relevant discount 
rate. The discount rate has two components: the real rate of  interest 
(reflecting the fact that one would prefer a real dollar now to one in the 
future) and the expected rate of  inflation (since nominal dollars in the 
future will buy less than they do today). In cases where plans are fully 
indexed (such as social security and federal government employee retire- 
ment benefits), the inflation component disappears. Where future ben- 
efits are only pastly indexed (as with many state and local government 
plans), only the uncovered portion of  inflation is included. 
By structuring pensions so that their value falls when receipt is post- 
poned past some age, employers can ensure either job exit or a reduction 
of real wages of  workers who remain on the job past that age. We define 
DELTA as the change in pension wealth from period 0 to period 1 plus 
C(0)-the  worker’s contribution to the pension during the period (which 
is 0 in noncontributing plans): 
(2)  DELTA = WEALTH(0) -  WEALTH(1) + C(0) 
The sign and magnitude of DELTA depend on how the benefit stream 
changes when one delays receipt. There are two possible sources of  a 
change in Bi:  the benefit calculation formula and the postponed benefit 
adjustment formula. In a defined contribution pension system, yearly 
benefits are based on employer and employee contributions paid into the 
system. A worker continuing on his job until period 1 would increase 
Bi(s)  in the future because of  increased contributions by him or the firm. 
Most pension systems are defined benefit plans, however, in which there 
is no direct relationship between yearly contributions and benefits. In 
such a case, Bi(s)  will increase on the basis of other criteria, like years of 
service, average earnings, or age. 
Actuarial adjustments are additional changes in Bi(s)  which compen- 
sate workers for postponing acceptance. Bi(s)  increases by some percent- 398  Richard V. BurkhauserJJoseph  F. Quinn 
age for each year benefits are postponed. Thus, pension wealth is sensi- 
tive to the method in  which benefits are adjusted, either directly by 
increased contributions or by some defined benefit rule, or because of an 
actuarial supplement for postponed receipt. 
It is important to recognize the difference between pension wealth and 
the pension income available in a single year. Two workers both eligible 
to receive $5,000 in annual pension benefits if they left their jobs today 
may act quite differently if  the first worker, by  delaying acceptance, 
receives a substantially larger yearly pension in the future, while the 
second worker receives no increase in benefits. In the first case, the 
increase in future benefits offsets the loss in pension benefits this year, 
while in the latter case, postponed benefits are lost forever. 
How then does a typical pension affect life cycle earnings? For simplic- 
ity, we assume in figure 12.1 that the VMP of a worker on the job and in 
all other activities is  constant across life, but that the employer and 
employee find that it  is optimal to agree on a lower yearly salary at 
younger ages. Total yearly compensation (what we define as net earn- 
ings) equals wages and salary minus DELTA, the loss in pension wealth.' 
In this example, we assume the worker is vested at age A,  first starts to 
receive total compensation above VMP at age B,  and reaches peak total 
earnings and pension wealth at P. After that age, decreases in the asset 
value of the pension reduce net earnings until at S* they just equal VMP. 
$ 
Wage  Earnings 
and 
Net  Earnings 
I 
HAB  P  S*  Age 
A  P  S*  Age 
Fig. 12.1  Life cycle gross and net earnings of  a worker in a given firm. 399  Pensions and Life Cycle Compensation 
Notice,  however, that lifetime earnings  also equal lifetime marginal 
product. Hence, the area (HZJKL) equals the area (JPQ) (in present 
discounted value terms). The ability to mix pension benefits and salary 
enables the employer to decrease actual net  earnings, even as wage 
earnings (the size of the paycheck) continue to increase. We argue that 
changes in pension wealth can have a significant effect on the actual net 
earnings of older workers and can provide employers with an alternative 
means of  enforcing long-term labor contracts. 
12.2  The Importance of Retirement Income Plans 
Pension wealth is important in the retirement decision in two ways. 
First, it has a wealth effect as does any asset. The higher the pension 
wealth, ceteris paribus, the higher the probability of  labor force with- 
drawal. But equally important, pension wealth is not a constant, it varies 
with the age at which the pension is claimed. This concept of  wealth 
change (DELTA) is central to this paper, and we treat this change as a 
component of current compensation. When positive, DELTA represents 
a wealth loss-a  cost to continued work, or equivalently, an earnings 
reduction. When negative, the present discounted value is increasing by 
more than the employee contributions, and net earnings are higher than 
they appear. 
Both the WEALTH and DELTA values for workers around retire- 
ment  age can  be substantial. We  use  data from  the Social Security 
Administration’s Retirement  History  Study (RHS) to estimate these 
values. (A description of the data and the derivation of  these variables 
appears in the appendix.) Table 12.1 shows pension WEALTH values for 
full-time, private sector, male workers (not self-employed) aged 63 to 65 
in 1974, using 5 and 10 percent discount rates.2  Almost two-thirds of  the 
sample has some pension wealth  (either from their current job or a 
previous  job).  Using the lower discount rate, over 5 percent  of  our 
sample (9 percent of  those with pensions) has over $50,000 (in  1974 
dollars) in pension  wealth, and one-third of  the entire sample  (over 
one-half of those with pensions) has benefits in excess of  $20,000. One 
measure of the value of a pension for the group is that the median pension 
wealth value for those with pensions-about  $21,0004~  over twice the 
value of  median annual wage earnings for this group ($9,400). At the 
higher  10 percent  discount  rate, pension  wealths are lower, but  the 
median is still over $15,000--one  and a half  times the average annual 
earnings. 
DELTA values for these same respondents are shown in table 12.2. 
These values are positive when the wealth value of a pension falls over the 
year. While we know the yearly pension benefit of workers in the RHS, 
we do not know the method used by each private pension to derive these Table 12.1  Percentage Distribution of  Pension WEALTH for Full-Time Employed Men, Aged 63 to 65, 
by Age and Discount Rate (5% and lo%),  1974 
$5,001-  $10,001-  $20,001-  $30,001-  $50,001- 
$1-5,000  10,ooO  20,000  30,000  50,000  75,000  $75,001+  N  Median"  Age  0 
Discount Rate = 5% 
63  36.5  4.8  13.2  12.1  12.2  13.8  7.4  0.0  189  $21,500 
64  36.2  5.5  11.0  18.1  16.5  11.0  1.6  0.0  127  $17,813 
65  38.6  4.0  2.0  17.8  11.9  14.9  6.9  4.0  101  $26,250 
Discount Rate = 10% 
63  36.5  11.1  13.2  16.4  9.5  11.6  1.6  0.0  189  $15,000 
64  36.2  11.0  12.6  24.4  12.6  3.1  0.0  0.0  127  $12,708 
65  38 6  4.0  10.9  14.9  12.9  14.9  3.0  1  .o  101  $20,417 
Source: (for all tables): Retirement History Study, 1969-75. 
"Median of  those with positive pension WEALTH. Medians calculated on  intervals of  $2,500. Table 12.2  Percentage Distribution of Pension DELTAS" for Full-Time Employed Men, Aged 63 to 65, 
by  Age and Discount Rate (5% and lo%),  1974 
$ -  2,000  $ -  999  $1,001-  $2,001-  $3,001-  $4,001- 
Age  to -1,OOO  to -1  Ob  $1-1,000  2,000  3,000  4,000  5,000  $5,001 +  N  Median' 
Discount Rate = 5% 
63  3.2  21.7  43.4  20.1  4.8  2.6  1.6  0.5  2.1  189  $148 
64  0.0  3.9  46.5  18.9  15.0  11.0  0.0  3.9  0.8  127  $1,156 
65  0.0  1.0  47.5  10.9  13.9  12.9  4.0  4.0  5.9  101  $2,062 
Discount Rate = 10% 
63  1.6  18.0  43.4  13.8  12.2  5.3  3.2  0.0  2.6  189  $482 
64  0.0  3.1  46.5  15.7  16.5  10.2  3.1  2.4  2.4  127  $1,393 
65  0.0  1  .o  47.5  8.9  13.9  12.9  4.0  4.0  7.9  101  $2,208 
"The difference in pension wealth when the pension is postponed one year from 1974 to 1975. See the appendix for a fuller explanation of  this variable. 
bSome  respondents have positive pension WEALTH but no DELTA because the pension was earned on a previous job. DELTA refers only to the changes 
in pension wealth on the current job, since this is the only wealth affected by current labor supply decisions. 
'Median of  those with nonzero pension DELTA. Median calculated on intervals of  $250. 402  Richard V. BurkhauserIJoseph F. Quinn 
benefits or to change them over time. Therefore, we have used data from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Level of Benefits Study to assign pension 
characteristics to workers in  our sample based on their industry and 
occupation. Since years of service is the dominant method of calculation 
in defined benefits programs, we assume benefit increases are based on 
years of  service, a value available in the RHS, and use industry and 
occupation averages to calculate actuarial adjustments. (A fuller discus- 
sion of our methodology is found in the appendix.) 
For workers aged 63, DELTAs (discounting at 5 percent) are closely 
split between positive and negative values. For those aged 64 and 65, 
pension wealth falls with continued work for most workers. The median 
loss at age 65 is over $2,00O-almost  20 percent of the median wage of 
workers aged 65 who are in jobs with pensions. For those aged 64 it is 
$1,156 or 12 percent, while for those aged 63 it is only $148. With the 10 
percent rate, future gains are discounted more heavily, and the resultant 
DELTA values are slightly larger. 
Using a very different methodology (data on actual pension plans are 
applied to hypothetical individuals), Lazear reaches similar conclusions, 
that the expected present value of  pension rights generally declines as 
retirement is postponed  (Lazear 1981, p. 20). He interprets this as a 
modern form of severance pay-a  bonus to those who retire early. The 
terminology is different from ours, but the basic point is the same- 
beyond some age workers are penalized financially by their pension plans 
for continued work. 
The incentives implicit in the social security system can be summarized 
in analogous fashion, although there are two complications. The first 
involves spouse7s  and dependent’s benefits in the event of  the respon- 
dent’s death. These are important aspects of social security coverage and 
should be considered. In this work, we have ignored children’s benefits, 
but have augmented social security wealth by considering the probability 
of the spouse outliving the respondent (using the age of each and survival 
tables) and collecting benefits on her own, at two-thirds of  the combined 
rate. 
The second complication concerns an option open to workers under 
social security, but not under private pension plans-to  continue working 
at the same job and collect benefits. A worker who stays at a given job 
cannot at the same time receive a private pension from that job. This is 
not the case with social security, which exempts a certain  amount of 
earnings ($2400 in 1974) and then reduces benefits by $1.00 for every 
$2.00 of  wage earnings. Since we are interested in discrete changes in 
labor force behavior (withdrawal from a given job), and because we are 
primarily interested in the impact of pensions on net earnings in a given 
job, we  have  ignored  this  option  and  have  defined  social  security 
DELTAs in the same manner as above-the  difference between current 403  Pensions and Life Cycle Compensation 
social security wealth and the wealth following an incremental year of 
work, plus employee social security taxes during that year. The more 
difficult it is for a worker to adjust his hours within a job, the more likely it 
is that discrete changes in labor force behavior will be the response to 
social security incentives. To the extent that workers receive benefits 
during that year and remain in their same job, this calculation overstates 
the social security cost of that employment and the disincentive to remain 
on the job. To minimize that problem, we have restricted our sample to 
those who are employed full-time and who are, therefore, least likely to 
combine work in the same job with social security receipt. 
Tables  12.3  and  12.4 illustrate  the  magnitude  of  social  security 
WEALTH and DELTA value to workers nearing traditional retirement 
age. Social security WEALTH is substantial for our subsample of  full- 
time workers. Coverage is almost universal, and over 70 percent of this 
sample has over $50,000 in social security rights (1974 dollars-5  percent 
real discount rate). At the lower 2 percent real rate, two-thirds of  this 
sample has over $70,000 in social security wealth. Wealth values rise or 
fall over time depending on whether the benefits lost by delay are out- 
weighed by  the future increments due to the recalculation of  average 
earnings and the actuarial adjustment. 
Prior to age 65, whether the actuarial adjustment and benefit recalcula- 
tion  outweigh the benefits lost through postponement of  acceptance 
depends on the discount rate used (see table 12.4). When a 5 percent rate 
is employed, about 80 percent of  the 63 and 64 year olds in our sample 
gain by delay. The median values of the wealth increases for those eligible 
for social security are $1852 (for those aged 63) and $857 (for those aged 
64). When a 10 percent rate is used, only 41 percent of  the 63 year olds 
and less than 20 percent of  the 64 year olds gain, and the median wealth 
losses associated with a year’s delay are $115 and $937, re~pectively.~ 
At age 65, when the actuarial adjustment drops to 1  percent (3 percent 
as of  1982), nearly everyone loses with delay, and the losses are substan- 
tial. Even with a 5 percent discount rate, the median loss in our sample is 
over $3000. At 10 percent, it is slightly higher. 
That industrial pensions and social security benefits are a major source 
of wealth for workers on the verge of retirement is clearly shown in tables 
12.1 and 12.3.4  That this wealth will vary to an important degree across 
potential retirement ages is seen in tables 12.2 and 12.4. As we will see in 
the next  section, ignoring the effect of  these changes will  lead  to a 
significant overstatement of the actual net earnings of  older workers. 
12.3  An Empirical Look at Net Earnings 
In this section we calculate the net earnings of men aged 59-65  who are 
full-time wage and salary workers in the private sector. It is this group of Table 12.3  Percentage Distribution of Social Security WEALTH, Full-Time Employed Men, Aged 63 to 65, 
by Age and Discount Rate (2% and 5%), 1974 
~  ~  ~~  ~  ~~ 
$30,001-  $40,001-  $50,001-  $60,001-  $70,001-  $80,001- 
Age  0  $1-30,000  40,000  50,000  60,000  70,000  80,000  90,000  N  Median' 
Discount Rate = 2% 
~~ 
63  36.5  4.8  13.2  12.1  12.2  13.8  7.4  0.0  189  $21,500 
64  36.2  5.5  11.0  18.1  16.5  11.0  1.6  0.0  127  $17,813 
65  38.6  4.0  2.0  17.8  11.9  14.9  6.9  4.0  101  $26,250 
Discount Rate = 5% 
63  5.8  5.3  1.9  12.2  68.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  189  $54,216 
64  3.1  2.4  8.7  12.6  44.1  29.1  0.0  0.0  127  $56,818 
65  5.9  2.0  7.9  1.9  20.8  55.5  0.0  0.0  101  $62,278 
"Median of  those with positive social security WEALTH. Calculated on intervals of  $2,000. Table 12.4  Percentage Distribution of  Social Security DELTAS:  Full-Time Employed Men, Aged 63 to 65, 
by Age and Discount Rate (5% and lo%),  1974 
$1,501-  $3,001-  -$6,000  -$2,999  -$1,499  -$749  $751- 
Medianb  Age  to  -3,000  to -1,500  to -750  to -1  0  $1-750  1,500  3,000  6,000  N 
~~ 
Discount Rate = 5% 
63  3  51  15  14  6  11  1  0  0  189  -  $1,852 
64  1  34  16  29  3  12  4  1  0  127  -  $857 
65  0  0  0  1  6  1  2  43  48  101  $3,044 
Discount Rate = 10% 
~~~  ~  ~~ 
63  0  1  3  37  6  24  24  5  0  189  $115 
64  0  0  1  18  3  28  31  19  0  127  $937 
65  0  0  0  0  6  0  3  28  63  101  $3,586 
"Social security DELTA is the change in social security wealth if receipt is postponed one year (from 1974 to 1975),  plus employee social security taxes paid 
during that year. Because of the peculiar technique used by the social security system to adjust postponed benefits, 5 and 10  percent discount rates were used 
in this table rather than the 2 and 5 percent rates used for social security WEALTH. (See note 3 and Burkhauser and Turner 1981). 
bMedian of  those with nonzero social security DELTA. 406  Richard V. BurkhauserIJoseph F. Quinn 
men nearing “traditional” retirement age who were expected to benefit 
most from the change in the mandatory retirement law. Using the first 
four waves of the RHS (1969-75), we study men who were aged 59-61 in 
1970 and these same men aged 63-65  in 1974.5  All the men in our sample 
remained on their same full-time jobs from 1969 to 1973. We analyze the 
effect of the private pension system on the net earnings of these men and, 
more importantly, on the relationship between the net earnings of work- 
ers with and without pensions and mandatory retirement. 
Table 12.5 presents the median  earnings and median  net  earnings 
(earnings minus private pension  DELTA) at various  ages for  three 
subsamples defined by  pension  and mandatory retirement  status.  (A 
fourth group, those without pensions but with mandatory retirement, was 
too small for analysis.) As can be seen, workers with pension plans have 
higher earnings than those without such plans regardless of  mandatory 
retirement. 
What then is the effect of  pension rules on net earnings in this age 
group? How do pensions relate to mandatory retirement as a method of 
assuring that lifetime contracts are enforced? In table 12.6, we calculate 
the ratio of  earnings net of pension DELTA to unadjusted earnings for 
those who are eligible for pensions.6  (For those not eligible for pensions, 
the ratio (as defined so far) would be 1.) The impact of age can be seen in 
two ways. The median ratios decrease monotonically, and decline to 0.83 
by age 65. In addition, the display of the distribution illustrates the shift 
from ratios above 1  at the younger ages to below 1  later on. At ages 59 and 
60, for example, most of these workers are enjoying a slight supplement 
to pay because of increasing pension asset values. By 64 and 65, however, 
nearly all are losing, and a substantial proportion is experiencing a pay 
decrement of  over 20 percent. 
Table 12.7 shows another interesting result.  Here we compare the 
median net earnings of those with pensions to that of those without. We 
disaggregate the pension sample by  mandatory retirement status and 
simply create ratios from the columns in table 12.5. For those without 
mandatory rules, we find that the median net earnings of  the pension 
subsample has dropped to precisely that of those without pensions by age 
65 (i.e., the final ratio in the first column is l.oO).’ For those with a 
pension and with mandatory retirement, the ratio also falls, but only to 
1.19. 
These results are preliminary and are based on small samples. But they 
strongly  suggest that pension  systems do eventually reduce the true 
earnings of  older men who continue on their same job.  In fact, the 
difference in earnings between workers with and without pension plans 
narrows dramatically as workers approach age 65, and for those in our 
sample, it  disappears entirely for workers  not  subject to mandatory 
retirement. Table 12.5  Median Earnings  and Earnings Net of Pension DELTA" by Age and by Pension and Mandatory Retirement Status 
Without Mandatory Retirement  Without Mandatory Retirement  With Mandatory Retirement 
Without Pension Benefits  With Pension Benefits  With Pension Benefits 
Wage  Net Wage  Wage  Net Wage  Wage  Net Wage 
N  Earnings  Age  Earnings  Earnings  N  Earnings  Earnings  N  Earnings 
59  $6,292  $6,292  66  $  8,250  $  8,188  38  $  8,700  $  8,583  69 
60  5,750  5,750  50  7,750  8,250  32  8,312  8,188  36 
61  6,594  6,594  42  7,833  8,167  19  10,027  10,292  34 
63  7,750  7,750  66  10,250  10,458  38  11,250  10,786  69 
64  6,521  6,521  50  10,075  9,479  32  9,791  8,441  36 
65  7,813  7,813  42  9,750  7,833  19  12,250  9,321  34 
"ension  DELTA with 5 percent discount rate. Earnings are in 1970 dollars for ages 59-61,  and in 1974  dollars for ages 63-65. Medians based on intervals of 
$500. Table 12.6  Percentage Distribution of  Ratio of Earnings Net of Pension DELTA to Earnings for Those with Pensions, 
by Age and Mandatory Retirement Status 
Less  .80-  .91-  .96  1.01-  1.06  1.11-  1.21-  Median 
Age  than .80  .90  .95  1.00  1.05  1.10  1.20  1.30  Ratio 
Without Mandatory Retirement 
59  11  0  5  5  39  39  0  0  1.04 
60  3  9  6  9  44  16  9  3  1.03 
61  16  0  5  11  53  5  5  5  1.03 
63  11  8  11  18  37  13  3  0  1  .oo 
64  28  28  25  16  3  0  0  0  0.88 
65  42  21  11  26  0  0  0  0  0.83 
With Mandatory Retirement 
59  7  3  1  13  41  26  9  0  1.03 
60  7  3  0  19  50  17  3  3  1.02 
61  6  6  15  24  29  21  0  0  1.00 
63  9  9  20  23  23  13  3  0  0.98 
64  25  42  8  14  8  3  0  0  0.86 
65  35  53  6  3  3  0  0  0  0.83 409  Pensions and Life Cycle Compensation 
Table 12.7  Ratio of Median Net Earnings of  Those with Pensions, 
by Mandatory Retirement Status, to Median Net Earnings 
of Those without Pensions 
Without Mandatory  With Mandatory 
Age  Retirement  Retirement 
59  1.30  1.36 
60  1.43  1.42 
61  1.24  1.56 
63  1.35  1.39 
64  1.45  1.29 
65  1  .oo  1.19 
Source:  Net wage medians in table 12.5. 
The net earnings of  workers subject to mandatory retirement  also 
decreased as they neared age 65. Nevertheless, their net earnings were 
still about 20 percent greater than net income of  those not subject to 
mandatory retirement rules. In fact, this may be the reason why manda- 
tory retirement was a necessary part of  the personnel strategy in these 
firms. 
In table 12.8, we add the effect of social security DELTAs, using a 5% 
discount rate. As mentioned above, workers can continue on their job 
and receive  social security  benefits.  For  workers  who  do both,  the 
DELTAs used here exaggerate the losses. Nevertheless, the results are 
provocative. Here we calculate the ratio of earnings net of  both pension 
and social security DELTAs to current  earnings for those  with  and 
without pensions. The medians suggest that pensions and social security 
on average provide a slight wage increase up to age 65. These medians 
hide a considerable amount of  dispersion, however. Among those 59-61, 
for example, between a sixth and a third of  those with pensions lose 
retirement wealth if they continue to work. At age 65, the median ratio is 
about two-thirds for those without pensions and nearly down to one-half 
for those with a pension. Thus, measures of compensation which do not 
take the effect of pensions and social security into consideration dramati- 
cally overestimate the value of  continued work  at this age. For the 
median workers in our sample eligible for both social security and pen- 
sion benefits at age 65, unadjusted wages overstate true earnings by 
almost 100 percent. 
In this paper, we have described and estimated some of the work (or 
retirement) incentives implicit in current pension  and social security 
rules. But we do not estimate the impact of  these incentives on labor 
supply. In a related paper, however, we do and find that changes in 
pension and social security wealth are significant explanators of the labor 
supply behavior of older Americans (Burkhauser and Quinn 1983). The Table 12.8  Percentage Distribution of Ratio of Earnings Net of Pension and  Social Security DELTA to Earnings, by  Age and Pension Status 
.70 and  .71-  .91-  .94-  1.01-  1.06-  1.11-  1.21-  Median 
Age  less  .90  .95  1.00  1.05  1.10  1.20  1.30  1.31+  Ratio 
Without Pensions 
59  0  0  0  6  23  41  24  6  0  1.07 
60  0  0  0  0  22  44  30  2  2  1.08 
61  0  0  2  7  19  33  31  7  0  1.08 
63  0  3  6  11  12  11  24  23  11  1.13 
64  6  4  8  10  16  6  32  10  8  1.10 
65  74  17  2  7  0  0  0  0  0  0.65 
With Pensions 
~  ~~~~ 
59  6  4  1  3  17  29  35  7  0  1.08 
60  4  1  3  7  12  29  35  3  4  1.09 
61  6  8  4  13  11  23  32  2  2  1.07 
63  6  1  6  12  7  11  34  17  7  1.12 
64  15  18  13  9  15  4  22  4  0  0.97 
65  92  6  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.52 411  Pensions and Life Cycle Compensation 
larger the DELTA values, the higher the probabilities that respondents 
leave their jobs over a two-year transition period. In fact, these variables 
do a better job of predicting transition behavior than do simple eligibility 
dummies. This is evidence that these incentives are important and that 
workers both understand their general nature and respond to them. 
12.4  Conclusions and Data Needs 
Mandatory retirement is one method of enforcing long-term contracts 
so that the earnings of a worker over his tenure with a firm will just equal 
the value of his marginal product. In this paper, we suggest that it is not 
the only method of  enforcing such contracts. Pension plans which vary in 
value across life enable employers to reduce earnings at older ages even 
when wage and salary payments as traditionally measured are increasing. 
Using data from the RHS we  show that pension WEALTH is  an 
important component of  a worker’s wealth portfolio and that pension 
DELTAs significantly affect net earnings as workers approach traditional 
retirement age. In fact, a measure of compensation which includes pen- 
sion DELTAs shows that workers in our sample who are not subject to 
mandatory retirement earn approximately the same amount for work at 
age 65 regardless of whether or not they are eligible for a pension. For 
those who are subject to mandatory retirement, earnings net of pension 
DELTAs fall as they approach age 65 yet still exceed the net earnings of 
those without pensions and mandatory retirement. Thus, firms do appear 
to have some motive to use mandatory retirement to enforce job exit. But 
adjustments to pensions also are used and appear to be an important 
alternative method of enforcement. Once social security is considered it 
is even less likely that workers will continue to work past the traditional 
retirement age. 
There are at least two implications of  these findings with respect to 
mandatory  retirement.  The first is that mandatory retirement  is  less 
important than a simple comparison of  workers with and without these 
provisions would suggest. This is because mandatory retirement often 
occurs at precisely the time that these strong social security and pension 
incentives go into effect. A simple comparison implicitly attributes the 
impacts of  all of  these factors to mandatory retirement,  and thereby 
exaggerates its effect. In our paper (Burkhauser and Quinn 1983), we 
estimate that approximately half of the raw differential in quit behavior 
can be attributed to factors other than mandatory retirement. 
The second implication concerns the labor market repercussions to be 
expected from changing the age of  mandatory retirement (as Congress 
has done) or from eliminating it altogether (as has been suggested). Our 
research indicates that the effect will depend dramatically on the extent 
to which employers can change other aspects of  the employment agree- 412  Richard V. Burkhauser/Joseph F. Quinn 
ment, particularly the details of the pension system. With enough leeway, 
we would argue, firms can bring about retirement patterns very similar to 
those observed with mandatory retirement. 
A major shortcoming of  this research is the lack of  knowledge about 
respondents’ pension plans-how  benefits are determined and how they 
change over time. This knowledge is needed for two reasons. It is re- 
quired in order to calculate DELTA values more precisely and to judge 
more accurately the impact of these incentives on retirement behavior. In 
addition, it is important baseline data from which to measure changes in 
pension rules in response, partly, to changes in mandatory retirement 
options. 
Specific data on individual pension plans are collected by the Depart- 
ment of  Labor and have been used by  researchers (Lazear 1981 and 
Urban Institute 1982). But such data are not generally available about the 
respondents who appear in large microeconomic surveys, such as the 
Retirement History Study. In other words, we have longitudinal micro- 
data sets with superb demographic and economic data, but with very little 
detail on pension plans, and we have excellent pension data with little or 
no personal data on the individuals covered.8That  we do not have both is 
particularly  unfortunate because there is considerably more diversity 
across pension plans than across social security. A much larger propor- 
tion of the population is not covered, and for those workers who are, the 
variation in benefit levels is e~treme.~  Linking these two types of informa- 
tion is not a simple process. Asking individuals about the details of their 
pension plans (beyond information like age of  eligibility and amount 
expected) is probably fruitless. Using existing Department of Labor files 
on pension plans has not been successful. And even asking firms may not 
always be the answer, because often they do not administer their own 
pension plans. The cost of gathering this institutional information is high. 
But  so, we  would  argue, is  the benefit.  In the meantime,  we  must 
continue to use broad industrial and occupational averages for the benefit 
calculation rules, as we have done in this paper, and accept the biases 
which such measurement error entails. 
Appendix 
The data for this research  are taken from the first four waves of  the 
Retirement History Study (RHS)-a  ten-year longitudinal analysis of the 
retirement process undertaken by  the Social Security Administration. 
The study began with over 11,000 men and nonmarried women aged 
58-63  in 1969. The respondents were reinterviewed at two-year inter- 
vals. By 1975, the last wave available when this research was undertaken, 
the sample was down to approximately 8,600 due to the death, institu- 413  Pensions and Life Cycle Compensation 
tionalization, mobility,  or noncooperation of  some respondents.  Our 
work is based on a subsample of  these 8,600 respondents. (For more 
detail on the RHS, see Irelan [1976].) 
Social security and pension WEALTH and DELTA variables were 
calculated for each worker for 1970 and for 1974. This was a relatively 
simple process for social security because RHS data include actual social 
security records, and because we knew the rules on which benefits are 
based. For 1970-71,  for example, we calculated 
(i)  WEALTH(O), the present discounted value, in 1970 dollars, of the 
social security benefit stream if the individual claimed benefits in 1970 
(see eq. [l]  in the text), and 
(ii)  WEALTH(l), the present discounted value, in 1970 dollars, of the 
stream which would begin in 1971, after the individual worked another 
year. Following the zero value for social security receipt in 1970, B(l) 
would exceed B(0)  both because of the actuarial adjustment past age 62 
and because of  the change in average monthly wages due to increased 
wage earnings. We assume real wages for 1970-71 would equal the actual 
1969-70 wages for all workers. Because these calculations are sensitive to 
the interest rate, we use a 2,5, and 10 percent rate, both here and in the 
pension estimates. 
As described in the text (eq. [2]), social security DELTA is this change 
in  the WEALTH value if  acceptance is postponed  one year plus the 
employee’s social security contributions during that hypothetical year of 
additional work. This same process is then repeated for the entire sample 
in 1974. 
Pension WEALTH and DELTA estimates for 1970 and 1974 were 
more difficult to obtain, since annual benefits had to be derived from 
individual questionnaire responses. As with social security, knowing a 
yearly pension is only the first step in estimating WEALTH and DELTA 
values. Because we had no details on the structure of pension plans, the 
following assumptions were made: 
(a) The yearly benefits described by the workers did not include a joint 
and survivor provision, though some private pension plans do  provide for 
actuarial adjustments for survivors’ benefits. 
(b) The benefit amount (B[s])  is based on years of service, so that an 
additional year  of  work increases the benefit by  lln, where  n is the 
number of  years with the firm. 
(c)  For those currently eligible for reduced but not full benefits, the 
benefit amount also increases because of  an actuarial adjustment. Since 
we do not know these actuarial adjustment factors for the individual 
pension plans, we used very rough industry averages. (These averages 
were taken from Urban Institute [1982], which used data from the BLS 
Level of  Benefits Study). 
The procedure was then the same as is described above and in equa- 414  Richard V. BurkhauseriJoseph F. Quinn 
tions (1) and (2) for both 1970 and 1974. We calculated two values of 
pension  wealth  (with and without  an  additional year  of  work),  and 
defined DELTA as the difference. The derivations were again done with 
2, 5,  and 10 percent discount rates. A fuller discussion of the problems 
associated with all the variables used in our analysis is available (Burk- 
hauser and Quinn 1983). 
Notes 
1. A comprehensive  definition  of  compensation  is obviously broader than this, and 
should include other fringe benefits (such as medical, disability and life insurance, paid 
vacations, etc.) as well as nonpecuniary  aspects of  the job, like working conditions and 
employment security. These are not included here because they are not the focus of  the 
paper and because we have no data on them for the respondents in our sample. Changes in 
these other dimensions of compensation after a particular age (for example, a cessation of 
medical benefits after age 65) could certainly be important, and would have the same type of 
effect as would a decrease in pension wealth. 
In this paper, DELTA is defined to equal the loss in pension wealth plus employee 
contributions during the year. For ease of  exposition, the latter phrase is often dropped. 
Operationally, for employer pensions we assumed C(0) was zero; for social security we used 
employee payroll taxes in a given year. 
2. Private pensions include all employer pensions, but do not include social security, 
which is considered separately. Most private sector pensions are not automatically indexed 
for inflation after retirement, so a nominal rate of  interest should be used in discounting. 
The early 1970s were a transitionary period for inflationary expectations, so we use two 
discount rates, 5 and 10 percent. When we consider social security benefits below, we use 
lower real rates (2 and 5 percent) since benefit adjustments have traditionally been greater 
than or equal to the cost of living-previously  by congressional action and now by law. 
3. Due to a quirk in the social security law prior to 1977, we employ higher discount rates 
for the social security DELTA than for social security WEALTH. From 1961 to 1977, the 
absolute cost of  living raises given to those who retired early at actuarially reduced amounts 
were the same as the increments  to those who claimed benefits at 65 (Burkhauser and 
Turner 1981). The penalty for early retirement was therefore a constant dollar amount, not 
a constant percentage.  One discounts a constant dollar amount with the nominal rate of 
interest, not the real rate used with social security wealth. 
It should be remembered that social security DELTA contains both the change in wealth 
(usually a loss at age 65) plus the employee’s social security contribution during the year. 
The full-time workers in our sample are disproportionately  high wage earners, so  their 
DELTAS  are generally higher than those in the general population. 
4. This point is confirmed in a related paper, in which pension and social security wealth 
are explicitly compared to other more traditional forms of wealth-financial  assets and net 
equity in the home, business, or real estate (Quinn 1983). It is found that for many workers 
in this age group the asset value of  retirement rights dominate all other forms of  wealth, 
including the value of the home. 
5. The Retirement History Study reinterviewed the sample at two-year intervals (1969, 
1971,  1973, and  1975), and these  are the  four snapshots we  have.  We assumed  that 
respondents maintained their initial labor force status until the middle of  each two-year 
interval  and then made whatever transitions we observed in the subsequent interview. 
Hence, we refer to men aged 59-61  in 1970 and 63-65  in 1974. 415  Pensions and Life Cycle Compensation 
6. We are grateful to Cordelia Reimers for suggestions on the restructuringof tables 12.6 
and 12.8. 
7.  Since the magnitude of  the pension DELTA  values increases with age, we suspect that 
the pattern illustrated in table 12.7 is actually smoother than it appears, and the decline in 
the ratio more gradual. Unfortunately, our particular sample of  respondents with neither 
mandatory retirement nor pensions includes one age group (60 in 1970 and 64 in 1974) with 
particularly poor earnings (see table 12.5). When they are compared with the subsamples 
with pensions, the ratios are very high. We suspect that this would not be the case in a larger 
sample. 
8. The Department of  Labor has a data source which combines information on the 
details of  several hundred plans with the social security data on approximately 400,000 
individuals  in these plans.  With respect to demographic and other economic variables, 
however, the research is limited to the very sparse detail on the social security earnings 
record. There have been proposals to combine this source with current microsurveys (such 
as the Survey of  New Beneficiaries or the Exact Match File), but so far this has not been 
done. 
9. For example, using 1975 data on 244 pension plans from the Bankers Trust Study of 
Corporate Pension Plans, and a 10 percent discount rate, Lazear finds pension wealth for 
hypothetical individuals ranging from about $400 to over $400,000 (Lazear 1981, p. 19). 
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Comment  Cordelia W. Reimers 
This paper opens up a large terrain for future investigation. The basic 
insight about changes in the asset value of pensions being a component of 
net earnings-one that these authors have written about before-is  un- 
assailable, and the empirical work is sufficient to establish the practical 
importance of pension rules as a mechanism for reducing the net earnings 
of older workers and, presumably, encouraging retirement. Burkhauser 
and Quinn have clearly put  their  collective finger on an alternative 
mechanism to mandatory retirement. 
The actual numbers they  report  are, as they  are the first to say, 
preliminary, based on  very small and restricted samples and hampered by 
the lack of information on respondents’ pension plans that plagues most 
research on retirement behavior. I would therefore not make too much of 
the exact numbers reported here, but would urge Burkhauser and Quinn, 
and others, to try to refine these estimates further. 
For instance, if we are to believe these numbers, DELTA (even taking 
private pensions alone) does not appreciably reduce median net earnings 
before age 64; and social security appears to increase median net earnings 
before age 65. Yet most men currently retire before that age. Mandatory 
retirement cannot be the reason, either, so it appears that we have still 
not got a satisfactory explanation of  observed retirement behavior. 
But there are several ways the numbers might be improved upon, even 
with existing data, before abandoning the hypothesis. I shall discuss four 
problem  areas:  the calculation of  the private  pension  DELTAs; the 
model of the retirement decision; the use of the median earnings of those 
without pensions as evidence on the alternative wage; and the biases 
involved in the choice of  samples for study. 
I can’t say much about the way the private pension DELTAs were 
calculated, because the appendix is too vague on this point. But one 
question does arise regarding these DELTAs. To get around the lack of 
information in the Retirement History Study about benefit formulas, the 
authors use industry-occupation averages for certain pension plan char- 
acteristics. To evaluate this strategy, it is important to know how much 
pension plans vary among firms, within an industry and occupation. How 
much of the true variation in DELTA is being lost by this imputation? If 
industry-occupation averages are much alike, but firms vary a great deal, 
Burkhauser and Quinn’s method will produce a much narrower distribu- 
tion of private pension DELTAs than actually exists. Then the distribu- 
tions of private pension DELTAs and of  the net earningskurrent wage 
ratios would be more spread out in reality than appears in tables 12.2, 
Cordelia W. Reimers is associate professor of  economics at Hunter College of  the City 
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12.6, and 12.8 of  the paper. How this might affect the medians is any- 
body’s guess. 
On a related point about measurement, these net earningskurrent 
wage ratios should of course be measured, insofar as possible, net of taxes 
and inclusive of  other fringe benefits-especially  those that change with 
age. It’s not clear that taxes have been netted out of the numbers reported 
in the paper. 
I now turn to the way Burkhauser and Quinn model the retirement 
decision and use the numbers as evidence bearing on the hypothesis that 
pension  rules induce retirement.  First, their model of  the retirement 
decision, while a major improvement over one that simply compares the 
current period’s wage and pension benefit, is still too myopic. There is no 
more reason for a worker to consider only his current period wage than 
only his current period pension benefit. The  optimal timing of retirement 
involves comparison of the present values of the entire streams of future 
wages, alternative wages (or values of  nonmarket time), and pension 
benefits. To use a one-period wage comparison in modeling retirement, 
one must assume that once net earnings dip below the alternative wage, 
they remain there forever after. (To see this, ask yourself why we do not 
expect a man of 35 to  retire from the labor force just because he has a spell 
of disability or unemployment that drastically, but temporarily, reduces 
his market wage.) We may be perfectly comfortable making this assump- 
tion for older men, but we ought to be explicit about it. 
Second, the numbers in table 12.7 of the paper appear to be presented 
as evidence about whether the private pension DELTAs are large enough 
to induce retirement. But there are several difficulties in interpreting 
them that way. If  we are trying to explain retirement, we will want to 
know how a man’s net earnings compare with his own alternative, or 
reservation, wage. If  we know how much pension DELTAs reduce net 
earnings, one additional piece of  information is needed: how the net 
earnings compare with the alternative wage. Burkhauser and Quinn seem 
to interpret their table 12.7 as if  it contained that sort of  information. 
What it does show is the ratio of  median net earnings of  those with a 
pension to median earnings of those without a pension, allowing for the 
private pension DELTA only. 
To interpret  these  ratios  as  containing  any  evidence  at  all  about 
whether pensions reduce net earnings enough to enforce job exit requires 
four assumptions about the median alternative wage: (1) that it is the 
same for those with and without a private pension; (2) that it is the same 
for those with and without mandatory retirement; (3) that it is equal to 
the median current wage of those who have no private pension; and (4) 
that the distributions of individuals’ net earnings and alternative wages 
just happen to be related in such a way that the ratio of  the medians is 
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Given these four assumptions, we could conclude from table 12.7 of 
the paper that, for those without  mandatory retirement,  the private 
pension plan alone is sufficient to reduce net earnings to the alternative 
wage level for half the sample at age 65. We could also conclude that, 
where it  exists, mandatory retirement  is needed  because the private 
pension plan does not sufficiently reduce median net earnings. These are, 
in fact, the conclusions drawn by Burkhauser and Quinn. 
However, I think it highly unlikely, first of all, that the median alterna- 
tive wage is the same across pension-mandatory retirement status, or is 
equal to the no-pension wage. The idea of  comparing net earnings of 
people with and without pensions to get a comparison of  a person’s net 
earnings and alternative wage would be justified by  a model in which 
people are randomly assigned to pension-mandatory retirement status 
and are identical in other respects-in  particular, their alternative wage. 
Moreover,  those without  pensions would have to be in  a spot labor 
market, where wage = VMP at all times. But this model violates the basic 
fact that pension-mandatory retirement status is not random, but results 
from a selection process such as Walter Oi discusses in his paper in this 
volume. 
For one thing, we know private pension coverage is positively corre- 
lated  with  education.  Besides, workers  will  tend  to sort  themselves 
among firms on the basis of mandatory retirement and their own prefer- 
ences for leisure (i.e., their reservation wages). Furthermore, even on 
most jobs without pension plans the wage probably includes some return 
to firm-specific human capital and therefore is above  the alternative 
wage. Some effort to standardize for education and other determinants of 
the alternative wage  should be  made  before comparing net  earnings 
across pension and mandatory retirement categories. Moreover, Burk- 
hauser and Quinn’s table 12.7  completely ignores social security, and it is 
the combined effect of  social security and a private pension plan that 
determines whether mandatory retirement is necessary to end the period 
when W>  VMP. 
Even if  we could accept assumptions (1) through (3), however, and 
take the median no-pension wage as a measure of the median alternative 
wage for those with pensions, there is a serious problem with using the 
ratio of  these medians as evidence on the distribution of the ratio of the 
two variables. Individual workers’ net earningdalternative wage ratios 
are  the variable of interest; yet what Burkhauser and Quinn report is not, 
even under assumptions (1)  through (3), the median ratio, but the ratio of 
median net earnings to the median alternative wage. This may be quite 
misleading. Suppose, for example, net earnings were distributed as in 
figure C12.1A, and the distribution  of  alternative wages looked like 
figure C12.1B, with everyone’s rank order being preserved. Then the 
ratio of  medians = 1, but the median ratio is clearly much greater than 1. 419  Pensions and Life Cycle Compensation 
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(In fact, it would be about 1.8.) It is obvious that we cannot, in general, 
learn much of value about the median ratio by looking at the ratio of the 
medians. 
Turning now to the authors’ choice of  samples for study: is it really 
necessary to confine the samples to full-time workers, and in some cases 
to those who were in the same full-time job in 1969 and 1974? If  the 
hypothesis underlying the paper is correct, men over 60 with large posi- 
tive DELTA are more likely to retire, other things being equal. This 
presumably biases the samples toward those men with small or negative 
DELTA (though the bias, in fact, depends on the correlations among 
DELTA, wages, and reservation wages). This could explain the authors’ 
finding that median net earnings are not appreciably reduced by private 
pensions before age 64. 
Burkhauser and Quinn are concerned  that people who take social 
security benefits while keeping the same job would bias their estimates of 
the social security DELTA upward, if they included part-time workers. 
They could presumably determine from the Retirement History Survey 
how widespread this practice is. My guess is that it’s rare, because it is 
hard to adjust hours drastically on the same job, and that the downward 
bias of  DELTA from selecting only full-time workers is more serious. 
This bias question is further complicated by the information in note 3 of 
the paper, that the social security DELTAS  are biased upward because 
the sample members tend to be high wage earners. 
Those are the main things that bother me about this paper. These 
criticisms should not obscure the useful contribution that Burkhauser and 
Quinn have made in emphasizing the potential importance of  pension 420  Richard V. Burkhauser/Joseph F. Quinn 
DELTAs and in actually calculating a thought-provoking,  albeit pre- 
liminary, set of estimates. I am sure we shall soon be seeing a variety of 
efforts to produce better estimates of DELTA, net earnings, and alterna- 
tive wages. I shall conclude with a few words about the broader research 
agenda in this area of  pensions and mandatory retirement. 
Lazear (1979) pointed out that, if  you have a long-term contract with 
W<VMP at first and W>VMP later, some cutoff mechanism is neces- 
sary, and mandatory retirement rules can play this role. In this paper, 
Burkhauser and Quinn show that pension plans may be structured with 
large positive DELTAs after a certain age and can then play the same role 
as mandatory retirement in a long-term contract. But these mechanisms 
are not identical, and none of this tells us why either mandatory retire- 
ment or nonactuarially fair pensions exist in the first place, nor why we 
see them used instead of simple wage reductions to terminate the period 
when W> VMP in a long-term contract. There may be some clues in the 
types of firms and workers that do and don’t have mandatory retirement 
and pensions  with large  DELTAs. Perhaps one mechanism is more 
efficient than another, depending on the circumstances. Perhaps they act 
in different ways to sort workers among firms according to workers’ 
preferences  about how  long to work.  The costs associated with  the 
various cutoff mechanisms need investigating before we will know the 
true costs of  raising or abolishing the mandatory retirement age. Burk- 
hauser and Quinn make a start in opening up this important subject. 
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